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PUBLIC BENEFITS AND FEDERAL 
AUTHORIZATION FOR ALIENAGE 
DISCRIMINATION BY THE STATES 
H 0 V104.RD F Cl-L4NC '-'  
vVhen Congress enacted sweeping new restrictions on alien ac­
cess to public benefits in 1 996, it not only imposed such restrictions 
directly on various federal programs but also authorized the states 
to restrict alien access to state benefits and to certain designated 
federal benefits, including Medicaid and welfare.1 The 1 996 wel­
fare legislation also prohibits states from providing "any State or 
local public benefit" to unauthorized immigrants unless the state 
subsequently enacts a law that "affirmatively provides for such eligi­
bility.""' These provisions authorize the states to decide whether the 
aliens in question should have access to public benefits. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has applied a lenient standard of re­
view to federal laws that discriminate against aliens.:-> In i\!Iathews v. 
Diaz, the Court held that Congress could restrict alien access to fed­
eral medical insurance.4 This deferential review of federal laws, 
however, contrasts sharply with the strict scrutiny that the Court has 
applied to state laws that discriminate against aliens in the distribu­
tion of public benefits." In Graham v. Richardson, the Court held 
that states violated the U.S. Constitution by discriminating against 
aliens in the distribution of welfare benefits.'' The Graham Court 
''  Professor of Law, U niversity of Pennsylvania Law School .  I would l ike to 
thank Evan Caminker, Daniel Halberstam, Roderick Hills, .Jr., Robert Howse, 
Richard Primus, Peter Spiro, Michael Wishnie, symposium participants at the New 
York University School of Law, and workshop participants at the U niversity of 
Michigan Law School for helpful comments. 
1 .  See Personal Responsibil i ty and Work Opportunity Reconcil iation Act of 
1 996, Pub. L. No. 1 04-193,  SS 402 (b) , 4 1 2 , 1 1 0 Stat. 2 1 05, 2264-65, 2269-70 ( cocli­
fiecl at R U.S.C.  8 1 6 1 2(b ) ,  1622 (Supp. I I  1994) ). 
2. See id. S 4 1 1 ,  1 10 Stat. at 2268-69 ( codified at 8 U.S.C. S 1 62 1  (Supp. I I  
1994) ) .  
3 . .JoHN E.  NowAK & RoNALD D .  RoTuND.\, CoNSTITUTION.\L LAw s 1 4. 1 2, at 
792 (6th ed. 2000) ("[A] l ienage classifications created by federal law will be sub­
jected to only the rational basis standard of review. "). 
4. 426 U.S. 67 ( 1 976) . 
5. Now.\K & RoTUNDA, supra note 3, at 79 1 ( "[W]hen state . . .  laws classify 
persons on the basis of United States ci tizenship for the purpose of distributing 
economic benefits . . .  , the law will be subjected to strict j uclicial scrutiny. ") . 
6. 403 U.S. 365 ( 1 97 1 ) .  
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offered two alternative rationales for its holding, striking down the 
laws in question not only as discrimination in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause but also as state laws preempted by federal poli­
cies.7 The question posed by the 1996 welfare legislation under 
these precedents is whether state discrimination against aliens in 
the distribution of public benefits should still be subject to strict 
scrutiny when this discrimination is explicitly authorized by Con­
gress. Some commentators have argued in favor of strict scrutiny, 
based on the theory that Congress cannot devolve its power to dis­
criminate against aliens to the states." In Aliessa v. Novello, the 
Court of Appeals of New York recently agreed, applying strict scru­
tiny and striking down a New York law discriminating against aliens 
in the distribution of Medicaid benefits despite federal authoriza­
tion for such discriminationY 
In this essay, I offer a skeptical view of the "nondevolvability 
principle," which would apply strict scrutiny to restrictions imposed 
by the states on alien access to public benefits even when such re­
strictions are explicitly authorized by Congress.10 My analysis of this 
claim takes the holdings in Graham and Diaz as given. Within those 
constraints, I raise some questions regarding the policy rationales 
commonly advanced in favor of a rule of nondevolvability. 
Nondevolvability would prevent the federal government from 
authorizing discrimination by the states under circumstances in 
which the U.S. Constitution would prevent the states from discrimi­
nating under their own authority. Why should we, as a policy mat­
ter, want to prevent the federal government from authorizing states 
to discriminate against aliens in the allocation of public benefits? 
The Graham Court declared that "Congress does not have the 
power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal Protec­
tion Clause."'' We may regard this declaration as dictum, given 
that the Graham Court held that Congress had not authorized the 
discrimination at issue in that case.12 In any event, this declaration 
begs the question: why should we think that the states are still violat­
ing the Equal Protection Clause when they act with federal authori-
7. !d. at 370-80. 
8. See, e.g., Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional A1Togation of Power: Alien Con­
stellation in the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U.  L. REv. 591 ( 1994) ; Michael J. 
Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigot1y? Devolution of the Immigration Powe1� Equal Protection, 
and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U .  L. RE\'. 493 ( 2001) . 
9. 754 N . E.2d 1085, 1098-99 (N.Y. 2001 ) .  
10. Wishnie ,  supra n ote 8, at 558. 
11. 403 U.S. at 382.  
1 2. See id. at 380-83. 
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zation?1:>, In Diaz, afte.- all, the Court indicated that the federal 
government itself has broad powers to discriminate against aliens. 1·1 
The Diaz Court placed the "responsibility for regulating the re­
lationship between the United States and our alien visitors" with 
"the political branches of the Federal Government."1'-, Because 
"these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers," 
they are "more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Execu­
tive than to the Judiciary." IG If these considerations allow the fed­
eral government to invoke objectives sufficient to overcome 
equality-based o�jections and thus justify discrimination against 
aliens, then perhaps Congress should be able to invoke the same 
goals on behalf of its authorization for states to discriminate, as sug­
gested by William Cohen.17 If the result in Diaz flows from judicial 
deference to the decisions of the political branches on matters deal­
ing with foreigners, then why should courts interfere with the deci­
sion by Congress that it vvould serve federal objectives to allow states 
to discriminate in the ways authorized by the 1 996 welfare 
legislation? 
I. 
UNIFORt\1I1Y A ND THE RJGHT TO 
INTERSTATE TRAVEL 
The Graham Court suggested that the problem with such an 
authorization is that it would allow for divergent state policies, con­
trary to the requirement of "an uniform Rule of Naturalization" in 
13. There are other contexts in which Congress may authorize state laws that 
would be unconstitutional in  the absence of such authorization. See, e.g., North­
east Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U .S. 1 59 ,  1 74 (1985) ( " When Congress 
so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitu­
tional attack under the Commerce Clause ." ) ;  Wishnie ,  sujJra note 8, at 539-41 (dis­
cussing foreign affairs); id. at 546-47 ( discussing the regulation of foreign 
commerce); id. at 5 6 1  (d iscussing Native American j urisprudence under the Equal 
Protection Clause).  
14.  Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U .S. 67, 8 1  ( 1 9 7 1 ) .  These p owers distinguish restric­
tions on alien access to public benefits from the California welfare law stntck clown 
by the Court in  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U .S .  489 ( 1 999) . The Saenz Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prevented e i ther the federal government or a state gov­
ernment from enacting the residency requirement at issue in that case. !d. at 
507-08. 
1 5 . Diaz, 426 U.S.  at 8 1 .  
16. !d. 
1 7. Wil liam Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State raws:/\ 
Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REv. 387, 420-21 ( 1 983) . 
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the U.S. Constitution.1" The Court of Appeals of New York recently 
adopted this same reasoning in Aliessa.1�) The federal power to reg­
ulate immigration and the relationship between the United States 
and foreigners, however, does not derive from the Naturalization 
Clause alone.�0 Thus, even if we agree that we need uniformitv in 
rules of naturalization, it does not follow that uniformity is required 
in other matters pertaining to aliens. In particular, it does not fol­
low that rules regarding alien access to public benefits or even im­
migration matters must also be uniform across different states. 
In fact, immigration consequences frequently turn on diver­
gent state laws. A few examples are sufficient to illustrate the point. 
For a marriage to serve as the basis for an immigration visa, for 
example, the marriage must be valid under state law.�1 vVe find 
other examples in the inadmissibility or deportability grounds 
based on convictions for crimes involving "moral turpitude."�� 
First, immigration consequences may turn on the maximum sen­
tence that may be imposed for the crime.�:� Thus, aliens convicted 
for the same crime of mor<d turpitude may face different immigra­
tion consequences because the states in which they committed the 
crimes may impose diflerent maximum sentences for such crimes. 
Second, for a conviction to be for a crime of "moral turpitude" and 
thus be a basis for inadmissibility or deportability, the nature of the 
crime, as defined by the statute, must involve moral turpitude.�-+ 
Thus, aliens that commit the same act in different states may f�Ke 
different immigration consequences because the states in which 
they commit the crime may convict them under laws that define the 
crime differently. In effect, our immigration laws delegate some 
authority to the states to determine which crimes trigger deporta­
tion or exclusion from the United States. 
18. U .S. CoNsr. art. I,§ 8, cl. 4; sN' Graham v. Richardson, 403 U .S. 365 , 382 
( 197 1 ) .  Others have also invoked this clause in arguing that the U .S. Constitution 
prevents Congress from authorizing states to adopt divergent rules on alien eligi­
bil i ty for public benefits. See Carrasco, supra note 8,  at 631 -38; Wishnie, supra note 
8, at 566. 
1 9. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1 085, 1 098 (N.Y. 2001 ) .  
20. Sel' Wishnie, supra note 8 ,  at 532 (identifying various sources of the immi­
gration power, including the Natw-alization Clause, the Foreign Affairs Clauses, 
and the Foreign Commerce Clause) . 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Sacco, 428 F. 2d 264, 270 (9th Cir. 1970) , wt. 
denial, 400 U.S. 903 ( 1 970) . 
22.  Se R U .S .C.A. s§ l l82 (a) ( 2 ) (A) ( i ) ( I ) ,  1 227 (a) (2) (A) ( i ) (II ) ( West 1994) .  
23.  See id. �8 1 lR2 (a) ( 2 ) (A) ( i i ) ( I I ) ,  1 22 7 (a) (2 ) (A) ( i ) ( II) . 
24. See, e.g., Goldeshtein \. INS, 8 F.�d 645, 648-49 (9th Cir. 1993) . 
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Our immigration policies may apply to aliens differently de­
pending upon the state in which they married or in which they 
committed a crime. Thus, there is nothing unusual about Congress 
deciding that, as a matter of federal immigration policy, we should 
allow the states to determine some specified aspects of that policy. 
The states are not entrusted with immigration policy in the absence 
of such federal invitation. Even with federal authorization, as when 
states decide which crimes to punish severely enough to trigger de­
portation, states may make their divergent decisions without immi­
gration consequences in mind. Nevertheless, we leave it to 
Congress to decide whether this state role and the discretion it al­
lows for the adoption of divergent policies serves federal policies 
regarding the treatment of aliens. 
Furthermore, even before 1996, states could adopt divergent 
policies regarding unauthorized immigrants. In De Canas v. Bica, 
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a California law that prohibited the 
employment of unauthorized immigrants.�" Rejecting a claim that 
this law was preempted under federal law, the Court reasoned that 
although the federal government had enacted no such prohibition, 
this state law was consistent with federal policy regarding these im­
migrants.:oi6 Similarly, states could adopt divergent policies regard­
ing the eligibility of unauthorized immigrants for state programs 
for the needy.27 
These observations raise the question: what is so important 
about a policy of uniformity regarding alien access to public bene­
fits? The Graham Court suggested an answer to this question. The 
Court suggested that variation among the states on this question 
would interfere with the right of indigent aliens to move across 
state borders and to choose to live in another state. An indigent 
alien unable to work would be unable to live where he or she could 
not "secure the necessities of life" because of denial of public 
assistance. 2<' 
The problem with the Graham rationale, however, is that it 
proves too much. A state could impose precisely the same eco­
nomic burden on the alien by failing to provide this public assis­
tance to citizens and aliens alike. Suppose a state chooses to have 
no state welfare program at all. Unless the Court is prepared to 
declare that the U.S. Constitution requires all states to enact welfare 
25. 424 u.s. 351 ( 1 976) . 
26. See id. at 361-62. 
27. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.  202 ( 1 982) , the Court did not compel  states to 
provide such access outside the context of public education . 
28. Graham v. Richardson , 403 U.S. 365, 380 ( 1971) . 
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programs, it cannot ensure that an indigent alien actually enjoys 
"the right . . .  to live where he chooses" as imagined in Craham.'2'J 
Indeed, the indigent alien could not enjoy the right suggested in 
Graham unless we require all states not only to provide public assis­
tance but also to do so using precisely the same eligibility criteria. 
Otherwise, there will be some indigent aliens unable to move into 
states that impose more stringent eligibilit-y criteria. If we do not 
consider it unconstitutional for states to adopt divergent welfare 
policies in general, then why should we regard it as problematic if 
they adopt divergent welfare policies regarding aliens in particular? 
II. 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES AND THE 
INTERESTS OF ALIENS 
The Graham rationale calls for uniform welfare policies among 
the states, but the Graham holding calls for uniform treatment of 
citizens and aliens in state welfare programs. These are two differ­
ent l)'pes of uniformity, and there is no necessary logical connec­
tion between the two. The poor fit between the policy rationale 
and the holding indicates that a different policy concern actually 
animates the Court's holding."'0 A rule barring discrimination 
against aliens is more plausibly explained as an expression of the 
"antidiscrimination and anticaste principles" cited by Michael 
Wishnie in support of a rule of nondevolvability."'1 If we seek to 
derive an antidiscrimination rationale for nondevolvabilit:y from 
Graham, however, we run into two problems posed by the Court's 
subsequent decision in Diaz. 
The first problem is a matter of logic. If Diaz qualifies the an­
tidiscrimination principle such that discrimination by the federal 
government deserves deference from the courts, then why not ex­
tend this deference when the federal government has expressly au­
thorized the discrimination in question? It would seem that the 
29. ld. at 379. 
30. Perhaps perceivin g  such problems with the right to travel as described in 
Graham, 403 L! .S .  at 380, the Court in Saenz v .  Roe recast the "right to travel "  at 
stake in state laws regarding welfare benefits as "the right of the n ewly arrived 
citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other c i ti zens of the same 
State."  526 U .S. 489, 502 (1999) .  The Saenz Court stntck down Cal ifornia's dis­
crimi nation against newly arrived citizens i n  that case, relying on the privileges and 
immunities c lauses of the U .S.  Constitution. ld. at 501 , 503 (citi n g  L!.S. CoNST. art.  
IV, § 2; L! .S .  CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1) . Aliens, however, cannot i nvoke the t-ight 
described in Saenz, because those clauses protect only the privileges and immuni­
ties of citizens. See NowAK & RoTUNDA, supra note 3, at 988. 
3 1. Wishnie, supm note 8, at 553. 
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same policies that support deference in Diaz. would apply to dis­
crimination by a state that occurs with the explicit prior <tppnwal of 
Congress. 
The second problem is a matter of consequences. Does a rule 
of nondevolvability actually serve the antidiscrimination principle? 
vVhat would be the consequences of a constitutional rule applying 
strict scrutiny despite federal authorization for states to discrimi­
nate against aliens in public entitlement programs? As long as Diaz 
gives the federal government a free hand in cliscrirninating against 
aliens, there is no presumption that a rule of nondevolvability 
would serve antidiscrimination or anticaste principles. As the Gra­
ham Court suggested, a nondevolvability rule would promote uni­
formity in welfare policies regarding alien access nationwide. As 
already discussed, however, the link between nationwide uniformity 
and the antidiscrimination principle is questionable. Thus, if an­
tidiscrimination is the real concern here, then the policy rationale 
is still insufficient to justiry a constitutional rule of nondevolvability. 
In any case in which the federal government authorizes states 
to adopt divergent policies regarding alien access to public benefits, 
we can presume that there exists some political support for exclud­
ing aliens from these programs and some political support for in­
cluding aliens. Peter Spiro has suggested that "state-level authority 
will allow those states harboring intense anti-alien sentiment to act 
on those sentiments at the state level, thus diminishing any interest 
on their part to seek national legislation to similarly restrictionist 
ends."'�� Whether or not this "steam-valve federalism" story out­
lined by Spiro is likely to describe reality,:>,:\ it should be apparent 
that a constitutional rule applying strict scrutiny to divergent state 
policies despite federal authorization would have uncertain conse­
quences. Given this constitutional constraint, the federal govern­
ment may sometimes respond with a uniform rule granting alien 
access, but it may sometimes respond with a uniform rule barring 
alien access. That is, if we insist on nondevolvability, then we may 
well get uniform discrimination as a result. What reason do we 
have for thinking that a rule of nondevolvability will lead to uni­
form access rather than uniform exclusion? 
Rather than creating "laboratories of bigotry against immi­
grants," to use Wishnie's phrase,M we might just as plausibly view 
:12. PeterJ. Spiro, LNnning lo Live with lmmignilion Fednalism, 29 Coi'iN. L. RE\". 
1627, 1627 (1997). 
33. !d. at 1630. 'vVishnie challenges Spiro's claim as a matter of histury. See 
Wishnie, s11jna note 8, at 555-58. 
34. Wishni e, sufJm note 8, at 553. 
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fecle1·al authorization of divergent state policies as creating labora­
tories of generosity toward immigrants. If we had bound Congress 
with a constitutional constraint of uniformity in the political atmos­
phere of 1996, then Congress might have excluded immigrants 
from Medicaid or \Velfare rather than leaving the question of immi­
grant access up to the states. If required to impose a uniform rule 
nationwide with respect to unauthorized immigrants, Congress 
might well have barred access to state programs for such immi­
grants nationwide without providing states the option of granting 
access through subsequent legislation. 
Thus, those who seek to promote the interests of immigrants 
have no principled basis for promoting a rule of nondevolvability. 
It might serve the interests of immigrants excluded by particular 
state laws adopted pursuant to the 1996 welfare legislation to have 
these laws struck down now, but the constitutional rule we establish 
in doing so may come back to haunt us later. A constitutional rule 
of nondevolvability like that adopted by the Aliessa court would not 
be result-oriented: it would not distinguish between instances in 
which immigration politics would favor uniform inclusion of immi­
grants and instances that favor uniform exclusion. \Ale would be 
stuck with a rule of nondevolvability even when it backfires and cuts 
against the interests of immigrants. 
Perhaps the connection between a rule of nondevolvability and 
the antidiscrimination principle exists not as a matter of principle 
but as a matter of empirical prediction. Critics of devolution feared 
that states authorized to exclude immigrants from their welfare pro­
grams would seek to encourage indigent aliens to move to other 
states by restricting their access to public benefits, leading to a "race 
to the bottom" that would precipitate widespread discrimination 
against aliens. I do not seek here to answer the question of whether 
we should expect such a race to the bottom."''' We should note, 
however, that the answer to this question does not necessarily have 
the implications commonly supposed for a rule of nondevolv­
ability/·6 
Suppose it were established that states engage in a race to the 
bottom when authorized to discriminate against aliens in welfare 
programs, as many predicted would be the result of the 1996 wei-
35. Spiro argues that the risk of such a race is small. See Spiro ,  sujna n ote 32, 
at 1639-46. States have in  fact been reluctant to use the invitation in the 1996 
welfare legislation to restrict alien access to public benefits. See Wishnie, sujJra 
note 8 ,  at 515-18. 
36. Spiro suggests that a "race to the bottom . . .  would militate strongly 
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fare legislation. Once thi:1 phenomenon has become apparent, we 
would expect Congress to anticipate this when it contemplates legis­
lation authorizing states ro discriminate against aliens in such pro­
grams. Indeed, given widespread predictions of such a race to the 
bottom, we might infer that Congress expected this when it acted in 
1996. If Congress anticipates widespread discrimination as a result 
of its legislation, then we can infer that Congress would have ap­
proved of these expected consequences. Therefore, any Congress 
voting to authorize discrimination by the states would be a Con­
gress inclined to exclude aliens from many public benefits. Given 
such a Congress, a constitutional nde of nondevolvability would be 
likely to result in a federal rule excluding aliens from the public 
benefits in question nationwide. Thus, if federal authorization for 
discrimination by the states is understood to allow a race to the bot­
tom, then a rule inhibiting or blocking such authorization will cut 
against the interests of immigrants and in favor of broader discrimi­
rntion against them through uniform federal legislation. 
On the other hand, if Congress expects very little discr imina­
tion to result from such authorization. then we can infer that a Con­
gress voting in bvor of authorization under these circumstances 
would be inclined to include aliens in the programs in question. A 
constitutional rule discouraging authorization for divergent state 
policies in such cases would be likely to cut in favor of immigrants 
because such a Congress would probably vote to include aliens in 
the programs nationwide. In either case, a constitutional rule of 
nondevolvability would tend to have a limited effect, whether 
against or in favor of the interests of immigrants, because we can 
assume that Congress would adopt the rule (whether excluding or 
including aliens) that most closely approximates the consequences 
expected to flow from federal authorization for divergent state 
policies. 
In any event, it would be a coincidence if a constitutional rule 
of nondevolvability were to cut in favor of equal treatment for 
aliens on average, because there is no connection in principle be­
tween such a rule and antidiscrimination principles. There may be 
many proposed rules that might reduce discrimination against 
aliens as an incidental matter, but this speculative effect would not 
provide a convincing reason to adopt such rules. We have reason to 
applaud a constitutional rule of nondevolvability as a matter of 
principle only if we actually value uniformity itself, not if we value 
antidiscrimination or anticaste principles, and not if we are moti­
vated by a concern for the welb.re of immigrants. Uniformity and 
nondevolvability per se strike no blow for any of those causes. The 
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only way to ensure that we uphold the antidiscrimination principle 
in the context of public benefits is to overturn Diaz itself.'" 7  As long 
as we take Diaz seriously, however, antidiscrimination principles 
provide no sound rationale for a constitutional rule of nondevolv­
ability. 
III. 
NONDELEGATION CON CERNS 
Gilbert Paul Carrasco has also suggested that federal authoriza­
tion for the states to discriminate against aliens in the distribution 
of federal benefits represents a delegation by Congress of a non­
delegable legislative power.3s Noting th at the nondelegation doc­
trine has "fallen into desuetude,"'�� he nevertheless urges a revival 
of the doctrine. In particular, he claims that federal authorization 
for discrimination by the states impermissibly delegates the power 
vested exclusively in Congress by the Naturalization Clause:10 
This claim is questionable on a number of grounds. First, the 
Naturalization Clause is not the sole source of federal power to dis­
criminate against aliens in public benefits. 1 1  Second, the federal 
government is not delegating an exclusively federal power when it 
authorizes the states to discriminate against aliens. After all, even 
without federal authorization, states may discriminate against 
aliens, subject to judicial review under a rational basis test in som e  
contexts, but subject to strict judicial scrutiny i n  other contexts, in­
cluding public benefits.4::2 Thus, even under Graham, the states en­
joy some power to discriminate against aliens, even with respect to 
public benefits. That is, the states and the federal government have 
concurrent powers to discriminate against aliens in public benefits, 
albeit with stricter judicial scrutiny normally applied to the states, 
such that the states bear a heavier burden in justifying such 
discrimination. 
37. Even overruling Diaz would not necessarily serve the interest� of aliens. 
To the extent that the courts make it difficult for Congress and the states to ex­
clude immigrants from public benefits, Congress may respond by imposing more 
severe restrictions on the immigration of indigent aliens ,  excluding al iens who 
would have been better off i f  al lowed to immigrate subject to the condi tion that 
they not accept  the public benefits in question. Application of the antidiscrimina­
tion principle to public benefits alone wil l  have uncertain effects on the welt�tre of 
aliens as long as Congress retains i ts plenary power over immigration policies. 
38. See Carrasco, supm note 8, at 626-31 .  
39. Id. at 629. 
40. Id. at 630-31 .  
4 1 . See Wishnie, supra note 8, at 532. 
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Viewed in this l ight, the issue is not really whether Congress 
may delegate or devolve the federal power to regulate relations with 
aliens, but rather whether federal authorization granted in the ex­
ercise of that plenary power should affect the degree of scrutiny 
that courts apply to a state exercising its own concurrent power to 
discriminate against aliens . Given the degree of judicial deference 
accorded to the decisions made by the political branches of the fed­
eral government on these matters, it seems logical that authoriza­
tion by these branches should imply similar deference for state laws 
enacted with prior federal approval. 
The U . S. Supreme Court in Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation 
applied such deferential review to a state l aw pertaining to N ative 
Americans that had been authorized by federal statute but chal­
lenged under the Equal Protection Clause.4� Noting that the state 
'\vas legislating under explicit authority granted by Congress," 
which authorized the state law "in the exercise of its plenary power 
over I ndian affairs ,"  the Court subjected the state l aw to the same 
rationality revievv that would have been applied to federal legisla­
tion "singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be 
constitutionally offensive,"  rather than the stricter scrutiny usually 
applied to state laws on the subject.44 Given the obvious analogy to 
the federal government's plenary power over relations with aliens, 
lower New York courts cited Yakima Indian Nation to uphold state 
restrictions on alien access to public benefits authorized by the 
1996 welfare legislation before the Court of Appeals of New York 
reversed in A liessa.45 The Court of Appeals of New York reversed, 
however, without discussing Yakima Indian Nation.46 
43. 439 U.S .  463, 500-0 1 ( 1 979) . 
44. !d. at 501 . 
45. See Alvarino v. Wing, 690 N .Y.S .2d 262, 263 (N .Y. App. Div. 1 999 ) ; Al iessa 
v. Novello, 7 1 2  N.Y.S.2d 96, 98-99 (N .Y. App. Div. 2000 ) ,  rev 'd, 754 N .E .2cl 1 085 
(200 l ) .  The U .S. Supreme Court has described tribal classifications as "political 
rather  than racial in  nature," based on membershi p  in "quasi-sovereign tribal e n ti­
ties." Morton v. Mancari, 4 1 7  U.S .  535, 553 n.24, 554 ( 1 974) .  Tribal classifications 
are thus similar to alienage classifications, which are also "political" insofar as 
aliens are normally members of a foreign sovereign entity. Wishnie tries to distin­
guish Yakima Indian Nation by arguing that alienage classifications are more "ra­
cial"  than tribal classifications, citing the analogy drawn by the Graham court 
between alienage and racial classifi cations.  See Wishnie, sujJra note 8, at 564-65 
(c i ting Graham v. Richardson ,  403 U .S. 365, 372 ( 1 97 1 ) ) . Tribal classifications, 
however, l ike racial classifications,  may be based on prej udice or antipathy, and 
cannot  be distinguished from alienage classifications on this basis. 
46. Despite cases applying rational i ty review to uphold statutes over the objec­
tion of Native Americans, Wishnie argues that rational i ty review is only appropriate 
for legislation that brnefits Native Americans. See vVishnie,  sujna. note 8, at  562 & 
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Even if the nondelegation doctrine itself is inapplicable to the 
1 996 welhue legislation, the policy concerns cited in support of the 
nonclelegation doctrine may also support a rule inhibiting federal 
authorization for states to discriminate against aliens. Carrasco, for 
example, suggests that " forcing the elected representatives of Con­
gress to make the most difficult policy choices" is a reason to revive 
the nondelegation doctrine. fi The desire to make Congress more 
politically accountable and to prevent it from evading responsibility 
for policy choices, however, i s  quite general. Unless courts are pre­
pared to apply the nonclelegation doctrine broadly in other con­
texts, those who invoke nonclelegation concerns bear the burden of 
explaining why these concerns are especially acute when Congress 
authorizes the states to restrict alien access to public benefits. 
Once we seek a more specific reason to apply a rule of 
nondevolvability in this particular context, we run into many of the 
same problems that we encountered with the other proposed policy 
rationales for such a rule. For example, if the concern is that states 
will engage in a race to the bottom as they seek to encourage the 
indigent to reside in other states, then the argument seems to prove 
too much. This concern is not limited to the question of ali en ac­
cess to public benefits. One might expect such a race in any in­
stance in which states are authorized to choose divergent welfare 
policies, whether the indigent are aliens or citi zens. ·H' If the claim is 
that questions regarding aliens in particular s hould be resolved na­
tionwide by the federal government, we must explain why vve have 
long allowed states to adopt divergent policies regarding unautho­
rized immigrants, including their access to public benefits. 
n.352. But SPe Duro v. Reina, 495 U .S.  676, 692 ( 1 990) ( noting " the Federal Gov­
ernment's broad authori ty to legislate with respect to enrolled I ndians as a class, 
whether to impose burdens or benefits" ) . vVishn ie  argues that these cases do not  
suggest that "rationality review i s  appropriate for federally authorized state welfare 
laws that discriminate against immigrants. " \1Vishnie, sujna note 8, at 562. Even if 
the effect of federal authorization were constrained as \Nish nie  suggests, however, 
Congress could easily avoid this constraint  by requiring the exclusion of al iens 
from public benefits in  the absence of state legislation to the contrary. This de­
fault  rule would imply that all state welfare laws would bnrrjlt aliens compared to 
the federally specified alternative of excl usion .  I t  is hard to see what we would 
accomplish by requiring Congress to specit)' a cliscriminaton· default rule in  any 
legislation authorizing divergen t  state policies regarding alien access to public ben­
efits.  If anything, requiring this formal i ty would seem to i ncrease the l ikelihood 
that states will adopt discrimination against aliens by debult .  Such an effect  hardly 
serves the antidiscrimination p rinciples that Wishnie stresses. 
47.  Carrasco, supra note 8,  at 628. 
48. See Note, De-uolving 'vl'elfarP Progmrns to the Stales: A Fu/J!ir Choice Prnpative, 
1 09 HAR\'. L. RE\". 1 984, 1 985 ( 1 996) . 
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If the claim is that the states are more susceptible to xenopho­
bic passions than the federal govern ment, then the concern would 
appear to be the pro tecti o n  of aliens from discrimination, and the 
question again becomes whether a rule of nondevolvability would 
serve that objective. Even if it were clear that states are more in­
clined as a general matter to discriminate against aliens than the 
federal government is, we c a n  presun1e that a Congress authorizing 
the states to discriminate would understand the consequences ex­
pec ted to flow from its authorization, and we can thus infer that 
such a Congress is itself inclined to discriminate against aliens. 
Therefore, a rule that would frustrate authorization for divergent 
state policies m ay well lead such a Congress to exclude aliens from 
welfare programs nationwide. 
For example, to the extent that we generally expect foreign 
policy concerns to inhibit the federal government from discriminat­
i ng against aliens, we would expect these pressures to apply also to 
the federal government's  decision to authorize discrimination by 
the states or to repeal such an authorization. Therefore, a Con­
gress that nevertheless authorizes discrimination by the states is 
likely to be a Congress that would otherwise choose discrimination 
itself. By the same token , a Congress that refuses to repeal an au­
thorization to discriminate is likely to be a Congress that would re­
fuse to repeal any discriminatory rule that it had itself imposed. A 
rule of nondevolvability only ensures that the federal response is 
uniform, not that it will be kind to aliens. 
vVe may accuse Congress of avoiding difficult policy choices 
when it authorizes the states to make these choices instead, but we 
might also consider this response to be an appropriate compromise 
in the face of conflicting preferences. If Congress determines that 
the resolution of these m atters need not be uniform nationwide, 
then it may be desirable to allow different sides to prevail in differ­
ent states. Uniformity entails costs insofar as it prevents states from 
choosing policies tailored to local preferences. Congress might 
have thought it unfair to burden those states that have a dispropor­
tionate share of indigent immigrants. States, after all, have no 
power to regulate immigration, and Graham forces them to provide 
aliens access to public benefits on the same terms granted citizens. 
If required to impose a uniform rule nationwide, Congress could 
respond to these concerns with a nationwide rule of exclusion, im­
posed even on those states that would prefer to be more generous. 
But why should we prevent Congress from choosing the less restric­
tive alternative of giving states the option of generosity? It is not 
clear what we gain by foreclosing the possibility of a flexible com-
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p romise in which states can choose different responses to such is­
s u es.  Thus, the rationale for a rule of nondevolvability remains 
obsc ure. Even if we perceive some val ue to having Congress bear 
the responsibility for such decisions alone rather than sharing this 
responsibil ity ·with the states, we m ust weigh this benefit against the 
c os ts of imposing a rigid unifonTl rule nationwide. 
TV. 
CONCLUSION 
A rule that is consistent with the deference given to the politi­
cal branches in Diaz wendel defer to those branches when they 
choose to authorize divergent state policies. If  the policy rationale 
for such deference is to give th e political branches greater freedom 
in the conduct of our relations with foreigners, then this policy is 
undercut by applying strict scrutiny to th e state policies authorized 
by those branches:L9 If the un derlying purpose of this freedom is to 
enable the political branches of the federal government to use the 
treatment of aliens as a bargain ing chip in international negotia­
tions, for example, then judicially imposed constraints only curtail 
this freedom.''° For the federal government to n egotiate with for­
eign governments on these matters, it must retain control over 
alien access to public benefits. For this purpose, it is sufficient that 
the federal government maintain the exclusive powers to authorize 
discrimination by the states and to repeal that authorization .  As 
long as this authorization is revocable, the federal govern ment ulti­
mately retains control over our relations with aliens, whether it dis­
criminates against aliens directly or authorizes the states to 
discriminate . If the federal government is to maintain this control, 
a rule of nondevolvability is unnecessary. Thus, giving effect to fed­
eral authorization for the states to discriminate is m ore consistent 
with a theory that reconciles Graham and Diaz in a coherent way. 
49 . S!'e Mathews v. D iaz, 426 U .S.  67, 8 1  ( 1 976) ( "Any rule of constitutional 
law that \vould inh ibit  the flexibi l i ty of the political branches of government  to 
respond to changing world conditions should be adopted on ly with the greatest 
caution . " ) .  
50.  The U .S.  Supreme Court has suggested that i f  Congress o r  the President  
were to  impose a citizenship requirement for federal service,  " i t  would be justified 
lw the national i n terest in providing an incentive for aliens to become naturalized, 
or possibly even as p roviding the President with an expendable token for treaty 
negotiati ng purposes. " Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 1 05 ( 1 976) . We 
could say the same for authorization by Congress and the Presiden t  for states to 
impose c i tizenship requirements for public benefit� .  which would also create such 
incentives or tokens with the prior blessing of the federal insti tu tions with respon­
sibi l i ty for foreign afL1irs. 
